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I. Introduction 
“Poor Joshua!”1 
I cried when I read those words. It isn’t often that a Justice of 
the Supreme Court expresses understanding that real people are 
affected by the Court’s rulings, let alone grieves for them. It was 
an extraordinary moment in a Supreme Court dissent, a heartfelt 
response to a majority opinion in which the heart played no part.  
But, as Claire Hagan’s Note2 makes clear, it is not only in 
matters of the heart that the majority opinion in DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County3 falls short. The Supreme Court used 
DeShaney to set out a framework limiting the power of citizens to 
claim affirmative constitutional rights under the Constitution,4 
but its chosen framework is far less workable than the majority 
would have us believe. While federal constitutional protections 
are obviously not boundless, the lines drawn by the Supreme 
Court have led lower courts to chaotic and inconsistent 
interpretations and outcomes in cases involving institutionalized 
individuals.  
Ms. Hagan presents this case in a detailed and well-argued 
piece. She persuasively contends that in deciding DeShaney, the 
Supreme Court set the stage for the inevitable confusion and 
division among the circuits that continues to this day.  
Ms. Hagan begins by describing the DeShaney decision, 
pointing out errors in the assumptions on which the majority 
                                                                                                     
 1. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213 
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 2. Claire M. Hagan, Note, Sheltering Psychiatric Patients from the 
DeShaney Storm: A Proposed Analysis for Determining Affirmative Duties to 
Voluntary Patients, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 725 (2013). 
 3. DeShaney, 489 U.S. 
 4. See id. at 199–201 (stating that affirmative constitutional rights arise 
only when the state, through an affirmative action, restrains a person’s liberty, 
prevents the person from acting on his own behalf, or creates the danger at 
issue).  
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based its holding.5 Then, linking DeShaney with the Court’s 
decisions in Youngberg v. Romeo6 and Zinermon v. Burch,7 she 
surveys the intersection of these cases in six different circuits, 
summarizing the current divergent approaches to determining 
the affirmative rights of institutionalized individuals.8 She gives 
the reader a sense of how people in psychiatric institutions 
actually experience their admission and institutional treatment, 
and she exposes the pretextuality of the concept of voluntariness 
in the institutional setting.9 Finally, she proposes a clear test that 
could be effectively applied by courts in determining whether an 
institutionalized individual may claim affirmative constitutional 
rights.10  
This is an excellent Note, and there is little to disagree with 
in its approach. My Comment will begin by summarizing what I 
have learned from almost thirty years of experience about what 
actually happens in institutional settings.11 Ms. Hagan accurately 
sets forth both the coercion and the loss of even the most 
elementary forms of choice and control represented by life in an 
institution. These everyday realities of state institutional settings 
are not commonly known to the public, and while much has 
improved since I began this work in a law school clinic in 1984, 
the need to protect patients against abuses unique to the culture 
of the institutional environment still remains strong in many 
state facilities.  
Although the facilities have improved, the legal barriers to 
vindicating constitutional rights for institutionalized individuals 
have actually increased since the early 1980s. Increasingly 
conservative courts have imposed more and more roadblocks, 
                                                                                                     
 5. See Hagan, supra note 2, at Part II.B.2–II.C (discussing DeShaney and 
its aftermath).  
 6. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
 7. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990). 
 8. See Hagan, supra note 2, at Part IV (reviewing the split among the 
First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits regarding how to analyze 
whether states owe affirmative duties to voluntary patients).  
 9. See id. at Part V (describing how problems with competency and 
coercion affect voluntariness).  
 10. See id. at Part VI (setting forth a proposed analysis).  
 11. Infra Part II. 
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both substantive and procedural, to litigation on behalf of 
disenfranchised and vulnerable populations. The barrier in some 
circuits to affirmative constitutional rights for legally voluntary 
institutionalized patients is one major example of this trend. 
In the second part of the Comment, I will do what public 
interest lawyers in my field have always done: translate the real-
life experiences of patients in institutional settings into the 
formal structure of the law. Ms. Hagan has done an excellent job 
of surveying the tangled, complex, and contradictory reactions of 
the circuits to DeShaney by describing the leading cases relating 
to the affirmative constitutional rights of institutionalized 
psychiatric patients.12 I will complement her work by examining 
additional federal and state court cases involving these rights, as 
well as the most recent caselaw specifically interpreting 
DeShaney.13 Not surprisingly, the messages from the circuits 
continue to be at odds with each other, and some circuits do not 
even have an internally consistent approach. The conflicts in the 
circuits are so numerous that it’s surprising there has not been a 
Supreme Court follow-up clarifying the interpretation of 
DeShaney in institutional settings.14 
Finally, I will evaluate Ms. Hagan’s proposed standard in 
light of the standards currently used in the circuits and those 
that have been recommended in the scholarly literature.15 Her 
proposed standard is among the best, if not the best, of the 
proposals that have been formulated since the DeShaney decision 
to clarify and determine the affirmative constitutional rights of 
institutionalized individuals. 
                                                                                                     
 12. Hagan, supra note 2, at Part IV. 
 13. Infra Part III.  
 14. Except for sexual offenders and people in the criminal justice system, 
the Supreme Court has not had a single case on the constitutional rights of 
people who are civilly committed or voluntary patients in institutions since 
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993), and Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990), 
and both were cases involving procedural due process rather than substantive 
due process. The Supreme Court has not had a substantive due process case 
involving the rights of institutionalized persons since Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 
U.S. 307 (1982).  
 15. Infra Part IV. 
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II. DeShaney and the Real World of Institutionalized Psychiatric 
Patients 
First, like Justice Blackmun, I will speak from the heart. I 
spent almost thirty years as a public interest lawyer representing 
people with psychiatric disabilities, many of whom were 
institutionalized. I perennially negotiated the tension between 
understanding that courts must craft workable rules providing 
predictability and guidance in myriad situations, and frustration 
at the artificiality and inadequacy of those rules when applied to 
the people I represented and the situations in which they found 
themselves.  
Public interest lawyers serve as the intermediaries between 
their clients’ often horrific experiences of injustice and the judges 
in whose worlds those experiences are impossible to imagine. So 
we take true stories from a world that is fundamentally alien to a 
skeptical judiciary, and repackage them as legal claims, omitting 
the nuances to create a narrative that is meaningful in the 
judges’ language and world, all the while trying to be as faithful 
as possible to our clients’ original experiences. In doing this, we 
must accept and work with legal doctrines based on assumptions 
that fly in the face of what we know to be true. 
Nowhere was this cognitive dissonance more stark to me 
than in the doctrinal abyss that some courts have interpreted 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County to require, sharply dividing the 
residents of institutions.16 Under these decisions, involuntarily 
                                                                                                     
 16. See, e.g., Shelton v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 677 F.3d 837, 840 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (stating that, under DeShaney, a patient’s status as voluntary or 
involuntary determines whether affirmative duties are owed, though 
recognizing that voluntary status may change during admission); Torisky v. 
Schweiker, 446 F.3d 438, 444–46 (3d Cir. 2006) (recognizing that under 
DeShaney, states generally do not owe patients affirmative duties, but clarifying 
that DeShaney does not preclude affirmative duties when voluntary patients are 
not free to leave); Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1304 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(applying DeShaney strictly and concluding that states do not owe patients 
affirmative duties unless “the person is involuntarily taken into state custody 
and held against his will through the affirmative power of the state”); Monahan 
v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., 961 F.2d 987, 991 (1st Cir. 1992) (applying 
DeShaney to mean that a state does not owe affirmative duties unless it 
restrains a patient’s liberty by involuntarily committing him); Higgs v. Latham, 
946 F.2d 895 (table), No. 91-5273, 1991 WL 216464, at *4 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 
1991) (per curiam) (applying DeShaney as precluding affirmative duties to 
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committed individuals have affirmative constitutional rights to 
safety, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraint, and 
minimally adequate treatment necessary to realize those rights, 
while legally voluntary patients have no affirmative 
constitutional rights at all.17 The rationale for the distinction 
appears to be the assumption that legally voluntary patients can 
leave the institution if they are dissatisfied.18 
 I have spent a considerable amount of time inside state 
institutions in fourteen states and the District of Columbia, and 
in my experience, there is no difference between the loss of liberty 
suffered by civilly committed and voluntary patients in state 
institutions. Nor is there any difference in the control exercised 
by those institutions over the lives of civilly committed and 
voluntary patients.19 Voluntary patients are detained, restrained, 
contained, secluded, locked up, assaulted, and denied ground 
“privileges” and visiting passes in exactly the same way as civilly 
committed patients. Their lives are equally subject to control 
from the moment they arise in the morning at a preordained 
time, through meals and cigarette breaks and “groups,” to who is 
permitted to visit and when, to the long stretches of empty hours 
in the dayhall.  
                                                                                                     
voluntary patients). But see Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1306 (5th Cir. 
1995) (Parker, J., concurring) (“The Court’s holding [that a bright line separates 
voluntary and involuntary patients] is based on an erroneous reading of the 
Supreme Court’s guidance in DeShaney, and draws an arbitrary, illogical, and 
formalistic line between persons who are entitled to constitutional protection.”); 
Higgs v. Latham, 946 F.2d 895 (table), No. 91-5273, 1991 WL 216464, at *6 (6th 
Cir. Oct. 24, 1991) (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring) (“I do not read DeShaney to 
control the outcome of this case. . . . [E]ven DeShaney compels us to go beyond 
asking whether [the patient] was a voluntary admittee.” (emphasis added)). 
 17. See cases cited supra note 16 (consistently recognizing that involuntary 
patients are owed the affirmative duties of care and protection recognized in 
Youngberg v. Romeo); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) 
(establishing that the affirmative duties applicable to institutionalized patients 
include “conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive 
confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by these 
interests”).  
 18. See, e.g., Monahan v. Dorchester, 961 F.2d 987, 992 (1st Cir. 1992) 
(“Monahan’s complaint did not allege that he would have been barred from 
leaving [the state facility] upon request.”). 
 19. Like Ms. Hagan, I am excluding the ever-expanding number of forensic 
patients in state psychiatric facilities from my comments. 
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Voluntary patients can’t leave, and they know they can’t 
leave. Or at least they know they can’t leave once they ask to 
leave. If they ask verbally, they are often told they cannot be 
released. Sometimes they are given papers to fill out officially 
requesting release. If they file formal notifications of their 
intention to leave, they are either “persuaded” to withdraw those 
notifications or involuntary commitment proceedings are filed 
against them. 
The fact that state commitment statutes operate differently 
in different states may inform the formal legal analysis, e.g., 
whether staff is legally obligated to offer patients the opportunity 
to change their status to voluntary. But on the ground, the 
picture always looks the same: however a patient gets to a state 
mental facility, that patient cannot leave until either the 
institution or a court decides it’s time to go. 
In addition to being places of total constraint on liberty, 
which patients cannot leave at will, many institutions are places 
where use of force and threat of force is rampant and 
underreported, and where acts of violence that would be crimes in 
the outside world are covered up or characterized as “patient 
abuse.”20 Many of the female patients have histories of childhood 
sexual abuse and trauma that make institutional practices like 
being put in restraints by male aides particularly excruciating. 
Patients with histories of sexual abuse are asked to endure pat 
                                                                                                     
 20. See, e.g., Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86, 93–96 (1st Cir. 2001), cert. 
denied, 535 U.S. 1053 (2002) (reviewing trial testimony and jury verdict in favor 
of a patient beaten by staff after being restrained); Clark v. Donohue, 885 F. 
Supp. 1159, 1160 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (involving lawsuit over the death of two 
patients ages 35 and 40 at state institution claimed to be a result of “severe 
medical and physical mistreatment”); UNIV. LEGAL SERVS., INC., BEHIND LOCKED 
DOORS: SAINT ELIZABETHS HOSPITAL 4 (2011) (reporting that in a hospital with 
300 patients, there were 388 physical assaults, 10 sexual assaults, 7 suicide 
attempts and 10 deaths in one year); PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY INC., 
INVESTIGATIONS UNIT, A SERIES OF SUSPICIOUS GENITAL LACERATIONS AT ONE 
DEVELOPMENTAL CENTER: DID DDS RESPOND APPROPRIATELY? (2005), 
http://www.disability rightsca.org/pubs/702101.pdf; Special Litigation Section 
Cases and Matters, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/ 
casesummaries.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (linking to documents relating to 
patient beatings and sexual assaults in hospitals in California, Connecticut, 
Georgia, New York, Tennessee and Virginia) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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downs, strip searches, and body cavity searches.21 Even bed 
checks, a practice involving staff coming into patients’ rooms at 
night and shining flashlights on their beds to ensure that they 
are there, can be difficult to endure. 
Sexual activity in institutional settings is more common than 
outsiders might imagine, and runs that gamut from mutual and 
supportive relationships between patients through exploitation, 
coercion, and rape by other patients and staff.22  
                                                                                                     
 21. See Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 947 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied 130 
S. Ct. 465 (2009) (noting that 150 patients institutionalized in Minnesota’s Sex 
Offender Program were subjected to visual body-cavity inspections after a 
contraband cellphone was found); Aiken v. Nixon, 236 F. Supp. 2d 211, 218, 236 
(N.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that a voluntary psychiatric patient was subjected to a 
strip search upon admission pursuant to a “standing order,” rather than to a 
reasonable belief that the patient possessed drugs or contraband); Anne 
Donahue, Strip Searches: Going Too Far for Safety Needs?, COUNTERPOINT, July 
2009, at 1 (describing policies implemented by some Vermont hospitals to 
perform mandatory full body searches on patients being admitted to psychiatric 
units). 
 22. See Ammons v. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 648 F.3d 1020, 1032 
(9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 2379 (2012) (holding that a teenage patient’s 
sexual relationship with a staff member may lead to the facility director’s 
constitutional liability for failure to protect); Beck v. Wilson, 377 F.3d 884, 886–87, 
892 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding that qualified immunity protected state officials in 
a suit brought by an involuntarily committed raped woman who was the only 
woman on a ward full of men and had reported being afraid she would be sexually 
assaulted); Neely v. Feinstein, 50 F.3d 1502, 1505 (9th Cir. 1995) (denying 
qualified immunity for failure to supervise a staff person who repeatedly sexually 
assaulted patients); Walton v. Alexander, 20 F.3d 1350, 1353 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(involving a student at a state-operated residential school who was sexually 
assaulted by another student on multiple occasions); Rodgers v. Horsley, 39 F.3d 
308, 311 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (concluding that an involuntarily committed 
pregnant woman raped while on observation cannot recover because of insufficient 
evidence of past rapes at facility, even though the state was aware of sexual 
activity at facility); Higgs v. Latham, 946 F.2d 895 (table), No. 91-5273, 1991 WL 
216464, at *1–2 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 1991) (per curiam) (involving a claim by a 
psychiatric patient who was sexually assaulted by another patient); Davis v. Holly, 
835 F.2d 1175, 1177 (6th Cir. 1987) (involving a claim brought by mental patient 
who had sex with a staff member and gave birth to a child); Elizabeth M. v. Ross, 
No. 8:02CV585, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 45107, at *4, *7–8 (D. Neb. May 11, 2005) 
(certifying a class of women subject to rape, sexual assault, sexual harassment, 
sexual exploitation, and physical assault at three state institutions), vacated by 
Elizabeth M. v. Montenez, 458 F.3d 779, 787–88 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding a lack of 
typicality in that some women alleged being raped and sexually assaulted by staff 
and others by other patients, that most of the women were from one institution, 
and that most had already been discharged); Caroline C. v. Johnson, 174 F.R.D. 452, 
455–57 (D. Neb. 1996) (certifying a class of raped and sexually assaulted women 
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The use of restraints, which varies widely from facility to 
facility, can result in death or serious injury.23 In some facilities, 
patients are tied to beds with “five-point restraints” (arms, legs, 
and across the chest). In other facilities, they are tied to chairs. 
Due to a tremendous effort by the Joint Commission,24 the 
National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors,25 
and extraordinary dedication in states like Pennsylvania and 
Massachusetts, some state facilities are virtually restraint-free.26 
But in others, restraint remains commonly used, including daily 
use on some patients.27  
                                                                                                     
at institution); see also Winiviere Sy, The Right of Institutionalized Disabled 
Patients to Engage in Consensual Sexual Activity, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 545, 546–
48 (2001) (discussing policies regarding consensual sexual activities at various 
California hospitals). 
 23. See, e.g., Substance Abuse & Mental Health Admin., Seclusion and 
Restraint: Statement of the Problem and SAMHSA’s Response (May 2003), www. 
samhsa.gov/seclusion/sr_handout.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (“The use of 
seclusion and restraints on persons with mental health and/or addictive 
disorders has resulted in deaths and serious physical injury and psychological 
trauma.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Letter from Grace 
Chung Becker, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights 
Div., to Rick Perry, Governor, Tex. 17–18 (Dec. 1, 2008), 
www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/TexasStateSchools_findlet_12-1-08.pdf.  
 24. Joint Comm’n, Sentinel Event Alert: Issue 8, Preventing Restraint 
Deaths (Nov. 18, 1998), http://www.jointcommission.org/sentinel_event_ 
alert_issue_8_preventing_restraint_deaths/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 25. NAT’L ASSOC. OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRS., NASMHPD’S 
POSITION STATEMENT ON SECLUSION & RESTRAINT (2007), www.nasmhpd.org/ 
docs/policy/S&R%20position%20statement.Forensic%20Div.%20prop.%20approv
ed%20by%20NASMHPD.07.07.final.pdf (“It is NASMHPD’s goal to prevent, 
reduce and ultimately eliminate the use of seclusion and restraint . . . .”). 
 26. See, e.g., Gregory M. Smith et al., Pennsylvania State Hospital System’s 
Seclusion and Restraint Reduction Program, 56 PYSCHIATRIC SERVS. 1115, 
1116—17 (2005) (presenting the results of an empirical study that shows 
dramatic decreases in use of physical restraints in Pennsylvania psychiatric 
facilities from 1990 to 2000). 
 27. See Seclusion and Restraint Practice Standards: A Review and Analysis, 
MENTAL HEALTH AMERICA, http://www.ncstac.org/index.php?option=com_content& 
view=article&id=94%3Aseclusion-and-restraint-practice-standards-a-review-and-
analysis&catid=34&Itemid=29 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (reviewing various 
standards used in state hospitals’ restraint policies) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
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In sum, Ms. Hagan is correct that institutionalized people 
are vulnerable and in need of protection; they are also isolated 
from the oversight of the larger community and the norms of 
community culture. Institutions develop cultures of their own. 
Sometimes these are healing; more often they are not. The move 
to true community integration has begun, but in the meantime, 
those who are left behind in institutional settings deserve better 
than to be told that the state is not responsible for their safety 
because they chose to be in an environment that, in all truth, 
they cannot escape. 
III. Chaos in the Circuits: The Interpretation of DeShaney’s 
Application to Institutionalized Patients 
Ms. Hagan’s Note accurately summarizes, for the most part, 
the differences in approaches taken by the circuits in applying 
DeShaney to the affirmative constitutional rights of individuals 
in state institutions.28 If anything, she is too tactful to assert just 
how irrational and counterintuitive these results have been, 
including conflicting results within the same circuits. This is in 
part because the DeShaney Court was resolving a factual and 
legal situation far different from the situation of individuals in 
state institutions.29 The Court did not specifically address the 
nuances of voluntary and involuntary institutionalization 
because those issues were not before it. And yet courts in the 
various circuits confidently cite DeShaney as supporting their 
divergent approaches to affirmative constitutional rights within 
institutional settings.30  
                                                                                                     
 28. Hagan, supra note 2, at Part IV.  
 29. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
193 (1989) (stating that DeShaney involved a person injured by his father while 
living in the community).  
 30. See supra note 16 (collecting cases that apply DeShaney to cases 
involving state hospital patients).  
JOSHUA’S CHILDREN 803 
A. The DeShaney Decision Is Not Concerned with 
Institutionalized Individuals 
Although the circuit courts have taken DeShaney as a 
touchstone for determining the affirmative constitutional rights 
of institutionalized individuals,31 their interpretations of its 
direction have diverged considerably. This is not surprising: the 
Court’s comments on institutionalized individuals are delphic and 
ambiguous because the facts in DeShaney did not raise any of the 
issues involved in institutionalization. 
Joshua DeShaney lived at home in the community.32 He was 
in the custody of a hospital for less than a week because his 
injuries prompted review of his father’s parental rights.33 The 
state’s interactions with Joshua amounted to a visit, once a 
month, by a social worker.34 It is true that during each of these 
monthly visits, the social worker could see much that should have 
been greatly troubling, and that in the last two visits, she did not 
see Joshua at all.35 Joshua’s father beat him over most of his life, 
and continued to beat him without state intervention, until 
Joshua suffered severe and irreversible brain damage.36 
As horrific as the circumstances of the DeShaney case are, 
they are not analogous in terms of state responsibility and control 
to the situation of individuals residing in a facility operated by 
the state, staffed entirely by state employees, whose actions, 
schedules, and activities are under supervision twenty-four hours 
a day, who cannot leave the grounds of the facility without a pass, 
much less decide to leave the facility itself. The community has 
little or no interaction, oversight, or power to intervene at state 
hospitals; family visits are often regulated to a few hours a week 
and in some cases prohibited altogether.37 An institutionalized 
                                                                                                     
 31. Supra note 16. 
 32. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.  
 33. Id. at 192. 
 34. Id. at 192–93.  
 35. Id. at 193.  
 36. Id. at 192–93. 
 37. See, e.g., Doe v. Pub. Health Trust, 696 F.2d 901, 905–06 (11th Cir. 
1983) (Hatchett, J., concurring) (describing a hospital’s policy of restricting 
adolescent patients’ ability to communicate with their parents as part of a 
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individual is entirely in the hands of the state and at its mercy, a 
situation that could not be more different than that of Joshua 
DeShaney. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that, in rejecting claims of 
state responsibility for Joshua DeShaney, the Supreme Court was 
not completely clear about the boundaries of those 
responsibilities. As Ms. Hagan points out, the Court variously 
states that affirmative constitutional rights are afforded to 
“involuntarily committed mental patients,”38 to “a person [taken] 
into custody and [held] there against his will,”39 and to a person 
who “is institutionalized and wholly dependent on the State.”40 
The majority is clear about one thing: the basis of any state 
affirmative responsibility must lie in affirmative state action.41 
Neither an individual’s vulnerability to harm nor the state’s 
knowledge of both that vulnerability and the risk of private 
violence to the individual suffice to create affirmative 
responsibility on the part of the state.42 Rather, the state must 
clearly act to restrain the individual’s liberty.43 Ms. Hagan 
argues, and I agree, that the Supreme Court never intended to 
limit the evaluation of state action to restrain an individual’s 
liberty to an individual’s legal status at admission to a state 
institution.44 Rather, the analysis requires an examination of the 
degree to which the state has acted to replace an individual’s 
                                                                                                     
“privilege” system). 
 38. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199 
(1989). 
 39. Id. at 199–200. 
 40. Id. at 200. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 200–02. 
 43. The Court reiterates that the focus must be on the state’s action: when 
the state “by an affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s 
liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself” the affirmative duties are 
created. Id. A few sentences later, the Court underscores that “it is the State’s 
affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf—
through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal 
liberty—which is the ‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due 
Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against 
harms inflicted by other means.” Id. 
 44. Hagan, supra note 2, at 786–87. 
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ordinary control of his or her own life with its own control, 
regardless of the individual’s own wishes and desires. Ms. 
Hagan’s question to judge the state’s control over an individual—
can the individual leave state custody, or be taken from state 
custody by caring family and friends, or would the state prevent 
or prohibit those actions?45—is the right one, with the right 
results.  
B. The Patient’s Legal Status on Admission as Voluntary or 
Involuntary as Determinative of Constitutional Rights 
As Ms. Hagan notes, some circuits have chosen to rely 
primarily on a patient’s formal legal status at the time of 
admission to the institution to determine whether the individual 
is entitled to assert constitutional rights to safety and bodily 
security,46 although even these circuits recognize the state-
created danger, “special relationship,” and other exceptions, and 
many of the circuits also have intracircuit conflicts.  
Those circuits that rely primarily on the legal status of the 
patient may initially appear to have chosen a framework that at 
least allows for clarity and certainty.47 But even if that was the 
case, the test is not rational and leads to unjust results.  
It is not rational for a number of reasons. First, it bears no 
relationship to the Supreme Court’s underlying explication of its 
own standard in DeShaney. According to the majority, the reason 
that the state owes affirmative obligations when it deprives an 
individual of liberty against his will and places the individual in 
an institution is that the state has deprived the individual of the 
ability to provide for his or her own needs.48 This, as both Ms. 
Hagan and Justice Brennan’s DeShaney dissent underscore, is a 
                                                                                                     
 45. Id. at Part VI. 
 46. Id. at Part VI.A. 
 47. It actually is not so simple. See infra notes 90–101 and accompanying 
text. 
 48. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
200 (1989) (“[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so 
restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, 
and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs . . . it 
transgresses the substantive limits on state action.”). 
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whopping legal fiction.49 Nicholas Romeo, the plaintiff in 
Youngberg v. Romeo, was described as being “profoundly 
[mentally] retarded”50 and was no more able to fend for himself 
without help than Joshua DeShaney, regardless of his legal 
status. 
Second, Ms. Hagan points out that some voluntary patients 
are not actually competent to provide informed consent to 
hospitalization.51 In fact, she notes that the Supreme Court itself 
has held that states should foresee the possibility that voluntary 
patients may be incompetent to execute valid consents to hospital 
admission and treatment.52 Circuits have similarly considered 
cases in which the patients appear incompetent to consent to 
voluntary admission,53 especially in the area of people 
institutionalized with developmental disabilities.54 There is a 
substantial research literature going back over thirty years, but 
increased after the Supreme Court’s decision in Zinermon v. 
Burch, underscoring the alarming percentage of voluntary 
                                                                                                     
 49. Id. at 206 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 50. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309 (1982).  
 51. Hagan, supra note 2, at Part V.A. 
 52. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 134, 136 (1990). 
 53. In addition to the material cited by Ms. Hagan, supra note 2, at Part 
V.A, see Wilson v. Formigoni, 42 F.3d 1060, 1062–63 (7th Cir. 1994) (reviewing 
hospital documentation, where staff persuaded patient to sign in as voluntary 
even though her intake assessment noted that she “lacked decision making 
abilities, as well as appearing to be delusional” and “was only partially oriented” 
and “her thought process was fragmented”); Rennie v. Davis, 997 F. Supp. 137, 
138–39 (D. Mass. 1998), aff’d sub. nom. Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 
2001), cert. denied 535 U.S. 1053 (2002) (finding that the patient’s medical 
record evidenced that he was mentally incapacitated at the time hospital staff 
allowed him to sign a voluntary admission form); Butler v. Comm’r of Mental 
Health, 463 F. Supp. 806, 807 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (describing plaintiff’s 
allegations that she was taken to a hospital against her will and never 
knowingly signed any voluntary admission forms although the hospital had her 
listed as a voluntary patient). 
 54. See, e.g., United States v. Tennessee, 615 F.3d 646, 648, 650 (6th Cir. 
2010) (describing Tennessee laws allowing parental consent to substitute for a 
patient’s consent to voluntary treatment for institution serving patients with 
mental retardation); Doe v. Austin, 848 F.2d 1386, 1388–89 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(describing Kentucky’s comprehensive statutory regime designed to safeguard 
patients with mental retardation from involuntary commitment, but that 
parental consent was used to obtain voluntary admission for “virtually all” 
patients). 
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patients who have little or no understanding of the documents 
they have signed.55 Some state statutes explicitly contemplate 
noncompetent “voluntary” commitments.56 
A related, but distinct, issue is whether even competent 
patients exercise informed consent when they agree to voluntary 
hospitalization. An individual may be competent but not have 
sufficient information to make a decision. For example, 
Massachusetts law requires that a patient seeking voluntary 
status be given the opportunity to consult an attorney on the 
benefits and drawbacks of such a decision,57 while Wisconsin 
requires that a guardian ad litem visit some voluntary patients 
within the first three days of admission.58 In New Jersey, 
concerns about competence in the context of voluntary admissions 
led to a statutory requirement that people who want to be 
voluntary patients must have hearings, with legal counsel, to 
ensure their decisions are competently made.59 
                                                                                                     
 55. Donald H. Stone, The Benefits of Voluntary Inpatient Psychiatric 
Hospitalization: Myth or Reality?, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 25, 42–48 (1999) 
(discussing studies of competency levels and voluntary admissions). 
 56. Wisconsin, for example, has a category of commitment called “non-
protesting voluntary admission” that “usually . . . involves a catatonic or 
paranoid person who is unwilling to sign an admission form but who does not 
object to the admission[, or] an elderly confused person with mental illness who 
needs to be transferred from a nursing home to a psychiatric unit.” Diane 
Greenley, Civil Commitment and Voluntary Treatment, in RIGHTS & REALITIES II 
352 (Wis. Disability Rights ed. 2008), http://www.disability rightswi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2008/09/civil-commitment-voluntary-treatment.PDF (citing 
WIS. STAT. § 51.10(4m)(b) (2012) (providing that a non-protesting “voluntary” 
admission is only good for seven days)). 
 57. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123, § 10 (2012); see also Rennie v. Davis, 997 F. 
Supp. 137, 139 (D. Mass. 1998) aff’d on other grounds, Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 
86 (1st. Cir. 2001), cert. denied 535 U.S. 1053 (2002) (concluding that the 
hospital violated a patient’s due process when it failed to inform him of his legal 
rights under ch. 123, § 10 before the patient executed an application for 
voluntary admission).  
 58. WIS. STAT. 51.10(4m)(c) (2012) (requiring that a guardian ad litem visit 
any patient admitted as a non-protesting voluntary patient within seventy-two 
hours). 
 59. N.J. Ct. R. 4:74-7 (2012); see also Matter of Commitment of G.M., 526 
A.2d 744, 745 (Ch. Div. 1987) (“What good is all our effort in preventing patients 
from being ‘lost in the cracks’ if such a hapless category as the so-called 
‘volunteers’ is subject to being lost?”). 
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Ms. Hagan also accurately describes the coercion that many 
hospitals employ to pressure patients into voluntary status.60 In 
many states, patients have a statutory right to elect voluntary 
hospitalization rather than be involuntarily committed; in 
discussing this right, courts have continually noted that although 
technically voluntary, the patients can be prevented from leaving 
if they give any indication that they want to be discharged.61 
Doctors also sometimes improperly condition granting voluntary 
status on patient concessions such as agreeing to take 
medications.62 
Fourth, a substantial number of patients are voluntary only 
as a legal technicality, including minors, individuals under 
guardianship, and individuals in the custody of state agencies, 
who can be voluntarily admitted by their parents or guardians, or 
even their health care proxies.63 This was the case in Kennedy v. 
Schafer,64 described at length by Ms. Hagan,65 and in numerous 
other cases.66  
However, the most important reason that the voluntary–
involuntary distinction has no traction is that, both as a matter of 
fact and as a matter of law in every state, admission status 
makes no difference in a patient’s liberty and ability to leave once 
institutionalized. Even if they are completely able to provide for 
                                                                                                     
 60. See Hagan, supra note 2, at Part V.B (discussing coercive forces in 
inpatient psychiatric care).  
 61. See, e.g., Acting Sup’t of Bournewood Hosp. v. Baker, 431 Mass. 101 
(2000); In re Lesley B., 567 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1000 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991). 
 62. Stone, supra note 55, at 46. 
 63. Cohen v. Bolduc, 435 Mass. 608, 610 (2002) (noting that a patient was 
involuntarily detained and the health care proxy changed the patient’s status to 
conditional voluntary). 
 64. Kennedy v. Schafer, 71 F.3d 292 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 U.S. 
2548 (1996). 
 65. Hagan, supra note 2, at Part IV.B.2. 
 66. See, e.g., Shelton v. Ark. State Hosp., 677 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 2012); Z.T. 
v. Florida, No. 3:10-cv-672-J-20JBT, 2011 WL 5024640, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 20, 
2011) (“In Petitioner’s case, though he may have objected to his placement, it 
was not involuntary for Baker Act purposes [when he was ‘voluntarily’ placed by 
the Department of Children and Families, his legal custodian].”); Clark v. 
Donohue, 885 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D. Ind. 1995); Jordan v. Tennessee, 738 F. Supp. 
258 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); Doe v. Pub. Health Trust of Dade Cnty., 696 F.2d 901, 
902 (11th Cir. 1983). 
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their own needs, so-called voluntary patients are no more free to 
simply walk out the door and provide for those needs than 
involuntarily committed patients. A district court in Illinois 
cogently explained the distinction between voluntary legal status 
and the kind of liberty that the Supreme Court incorrectly 
assumed that legal status conferred: 
When an individual signs into a mental health facility run by 
the state, that patient may be consenting to treatment, but the 
patient is also being committed under the control of the state. 
The state may restrict the patient’s freedom to act, although 
the patient volunteered for this treatment. The nature of the 
discretion afforded state officials may be extensive because of 
the patient’s voluntary act, but the court is not convinced that 
the discretion of state officials is wide enough to sanction the 
deliberate indifference to the patient’s medical needs, or the 
patient’s right to safe conditions, while the patient is 
incapacitated or restrained in the mental health facility.67 
In all states, voluntary patients who decide to leave are 
subject to involuntary holds while institutional personnel attempt 
to persuade the patient to change his or her mind, and failing 
that, to decide whether to file for involuntary commitment. In 
virtually all cases where a voluntary patient files a notice of 
intention to leave, the hospital pressures the patient to 
reconsider, and as caselaw confirms, the hospital is frequently 
successful.68 If a patient continues to insist on leaving, the 
hospital counters by filing a petition for involuntary commitment. 
This is a reality of which patients are well aware. The DeShaney 
Court’s rationale that voluntary patients freely choose to avail 
themselves of the state’s services, and can choose to leave at any 
time, is fundamentally undermined by state laws permitting the 
involuntary detention of any patient—regardless of legal status—
who expresses a desire to leave, until an involuntary commitment 
                                                                                                     
 67. Estate of Cassara v. Illinois, 853 F. Supp. 273, 279 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
 68. Wilson v. Formigoni, 42 F.3d 1060 (7th Cir. 1994); Higgs v. Latham, 
946 F.2d 895 (table case), No. 91-5273, 1991 WL 216464, at *6 n.1 (6th Cir. Oct. 
24, 1991) (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring) (stating that a voluntary patient 
repeatedly requested to be discharged and was refused); Rennie v. Davis, 997 F. 
Supp. 137, 139 (D. Mass. 1998) (describing the numerous times the patient 
signed a form indicating his desire to leave and was pressured to withdraw it by 
staff). 
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petition can be filed. As the Sixth Circuit pointed out in Lanman 
v. Hinson:69 
In the present case even though Lanman was technically 
voluntarily committed, under Michigan law, once he gave the 
hospital notice of his intent to leave, the hospital could retain 
him against his will for up to three days. . . . [A]pplying the 
district court’s reasoning, if Lanman had decided to leave the 
hospital, and been retained involuntarily under § 330.1419(1), 
any § 1983 claims arising in those three days of involuntary 
confinement would fall under the Fourteenth Amendment. But 
immediately prior to his decision to leave, while his 
confinement was technically voluntary, the Fourth 
Amendment would apply to any § 1983 claims. Under such a 
system, while Lanman’s relationship and dependence on the 
state would not have changed, his constitutional protection 
would have. We do not believe such a distinction is 
warranted.70 
Lanman is typical of a number of cases in which the court 
puzzles over the constitutional significance of the legal status of 
“voluntary” applied to a patient whose injury occurs while 
actually physically restrained or locked in a seclusion room.71 In 
fact, the majority of cases involving patients who are voluntary 
and supposedly free to leave involve plaintiffs who are secluded 
in locked rooms, injured or killed in restraints, under continual or 
virtually continual observation, raped or sexually assaulted, or 
some combination of these.  
The district court in Estate of Cassara72 aptly noted that a 
patient in seclusion or restraints, even one whose legal status is 
that of a “voluntary” patient, is not actually free to leave:  
Moreover, that Cassara was placed by the Mental Health 
Center’s staff in a room that is used for restraining patients 
under guidelines established by state statute suggests a state 
restriction on liberty in a custodial, institutional setting. 
Although not specifically alleged, it is a reasonable inference 
to draw that Cassara may not have been free to leave the 
                                                                                                     
 69. Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 70. Id. at 683 (citations omitted). 
 71. See, e.g., Cassara, 853 F. Supp. at 273; Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86 
(1st Cir. 2001), cert. denied 535 U.S. 1053 (2002). 
 72. Cassara, 853 F. Supp. at 273. 
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facility immediately if he had requested to do so. The court 
finds little practical difference between a locked jail cell and a 
locked restraint room under the circumstances alleged here. 
Although Cassara was purportedly free to leave at any time—
even while in the restraint/seclusion room—it is not clear that 
he could merely walk out of the Mental Health Center without 
the state affirmatively consenting to or allowing his egress. 
Cassara may have had access figuratively to the key to his cell. 
The right to leave, however, does not guaranty the power to 
leave.73 
In addition to being unwarranted and leading to irrational 
results, the distinction between formal involuntary and voluntary 
commitment status does not even confer the virtue of clarity, as 
demonstrated by a number of cases.  
Ms. Hagan discusses the Sixth Circuit struggling with real 
world circumstances in Higgs v. Latham.74 In that case, Ms. 
Higgs was involuntarily detained by court order, but due to 
clerical errors and omissions related to her transfer, the staff at 
Western State Hospital thought she was a voluntary patient.75 
Despite this, staff repeatedly refused her requests to leave.76 The 
Sixth Circuit concluded that because Western State did not know 
of the court’s order to involuntarily detain her, she had no 
constitutional right to security and safety, and therefore her 
constitutional rights were not violated when she was raped by 
another patient.77 It is clear from the Sixth Circuit’s decision that 
if Western State had understood she was an involuntary patient, 
she would have had a constitutional right to be protected from 
rape at the State Hospital.78 And yet Western State would not 
                                                                                                     
 73. Id. at 279. 
 74. Higgs v. Latham, 946 F.2d 895 (table), No. 91-5273, 1991 WL 216464 
(6th Cir. Oct. 24, 1991) (per curiam). It should be noted that at the time Higgs 
was decided, it was denominated as a decision which should not be given 
precedential value. The Sixth Circuit discussed this issue later in United States 
v. Tennessee, 615 F.3d 646, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2010), noting that, as an 
unpublished decision, Higgs did not bind the court in later decisions. 
 75. Higgs, 1991 WL 216464, at *1–2. 
 76. Id. at *6 n.1 (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring).  
 77. Id. at *5 (majority).  
 78. See id. at *4 (“[T]he hospital was unaware of any commitment order 
and had been led by a telephone referral to believe that Mrs. Higgs’ admission 
would be a voluntary one.”).  
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have treated her differently in any way whether she was legally 
involuntary or voluntary; she was no more free to leave in either 
case.  
In another case, Davis v. Rennie,79 the court was faced with a 
plaintiff who had signed an application for voluntary admission.80 
However, the top of the form contained the typed notation: “the 
patient refused to sign a voluntary saying, ‘I don’t want to be here 
for a year.’”81 In addition, as plaintiff pointed out, he had been 
transferred to the state hospital from a private hospital because 
he was acutely psychotic, so much so that the transferring 
psychiatrist testified he could not possibly have been competent 
to sign a voluntary admission on the day he arrived.82 The state 
pointed out that after signing the voluntary admission, Mr. Davis 
had also executed four forms indicating his intention to leave the 
hospital, and then retracted them, arguing that those repeated 
retractions clearly indicated that he was actually a voluntary 
patient.83 The court rejected this argument as well because Mr. 
Davis had not been provided with statutorily mandated 
protections for individuals retracting their intent to leave the 
hospital.84  
Yet in a case decided earlier by the highest state court in 
Massachusetts, the estate of a patient who had been involuntarily 
committed to a state facility by a court, and then apparently 
converted to voluntary status, was found to have no affirmative 
federal constitutional rights to safety or protection because, even 
though she had been involuntarily committed, she had been 
converted to voluntary status prior to her death.85 No inquiry was 
made regarding the competence of her decision or whether she 
                                                                                                     
 79. Davis v. Rennie, 997 F. Supp. 137 (D.Mass. 1998), aff’d on other 
grounds, 264 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 2001), cert. denied 535 U.S. 1053 (2002). 
 80. Id. at 138. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 139. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Williams v. Hartman, 597 N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (Mass. 1992) 
(“Because the decedent was committed voluntarily to Fuller, she did not possess 
the Federal constitutional rights that the defendant allegedly violated.”). 
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was afforded the rights guaranteed to voluntary patients under 
any Massachusetts statute.86 
As is underscored by all of these decisions, a patient’s clinical 
and legal status can change a number of times during a single 
hospitalization, from voluntary to involuntary and back to 
voluntary, just as a patient can be incompetent on admission and 
regain competence during the admission.87  
None of this, however, has any impact on how a patient is 
treated, the liberty he or she has while in the hospital, or the 
patient’s freedom to leave. As Ms. Hagan notes, in Higgs v. 
Latham the hospital’s misunderstanding about the nature of a 
patient’s legal status made absolutely no difference in the 
patient’s actual liberty or control over her circumstances.88 
Although the hospital thought Ms. Higgs was voluntary, she was 
still repeatedly told that she couldn’t leave when she asked to be 
released.89 Yet in Higgs v. Latham, as in numerous other cases, 
Ms. Higgs was denied the constitutional rights that she would 
have had if the hospital had known that she was involuntarily 
committed. Civilly committed patients have a panoply of rights 
(safety, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraint, and 
minimally adequate treatment) that are substantially different 
from the constitutional rights of so-called voluntary patients 
(nothing). 
Well, not exactly nothing. As Ms. Hagan points out, there are 
numerous divisions and splits both among circuits and arguably 
within the same circuit, as courts struggle to interpret DeShaney 
and to create a framework that is both clear and rational to 
explain the degree of state involvement necessary for individual 
injuries to trigger constitutional remedies. 
                                                                                                     
 86. See id. at 1027–28 (containing the court’s analysis); id. at 1028–29 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the 
question of whether the decedent was a voluntary patient should be remanded, 
because “[m]any critical factual questions remain unanswered”). 
 87. Stone, supra note 55, at 31–40. 
 88. Hagan, supra note 2, at 782. 
 89. Higgs v. Latham, 946 F.3d 895 (table case), No. 91-5273, 1991 WL 
216464, at *6 n.1 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 1991) (Suhrheinreich, J., concurring).  
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C. Functional Custody: An Alternative to Formal Legal Status in 
Determining the Affirmative Constitutional Rights of 
Institutionalized Patients 
The Sixth Circuit provides a particularly good illustration of 
how courts struggle to fit the round peg of reality into the square 
hole of formal doctrine. Higgs v. Latham, and several previous 
district court cases involving individuals with intellectual 
disabilities90 strictly followed the voluntary/involuntary 
distinction to preclude individual claims of damages for injury 
and death by plaintiffs who were voluntarily admitted to state 
institutions. Yet both before and after these cases, the Sixth 
Circuit found—in Doe v. Austin91 and in United States v. 
Tennessee92—that class actions involving individuals with 
intellectual disabilities voluntarily committed by their guardians 
did state claims for constitutional violations.93  
In both class actions, the Sixth Circuit followed a rationale 
that would have applied equally well in the individual-patient 
cases: it looked beyond formal legal status, concluding that 
severely disabled individuals “voluntarily” hospitalized by their 
parents or guardians were not, in fact, as a practical matter free 
to leave, both because of their own circumstances and the 
requirements of state law, and that they should therefore be 
considered involuntary for purposes of their affirmative 
constitutional rights.94 This is a classic example of the “functional 
custody” analysis advocated by Ms. Hagan.95  
                                                                                                     
 90. Duvall v. Cabinet for Human Res., 920 F. Supp. 111 (E.D. Ky. 1996); 
Jordan v. Tennessee, 738 F. Supp. 258 (M.D. Tenn. 1990). 
 91. Doe v. Austin, 848 F.2d 1386 (6th Cir. 1988).  
 92. United States v. Tennessee, 615 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2010).  
 93. Austin, 848 F.2d at 1395; Tennessee, 615 F.3d at 655. 
 94. See Austin, 848 F.2d at 1388 (“[T]he commitment of mentally retarded 
adults by the Commonwealth upon application by a parent or guardian is to be 
considered voluntary.”); Tennessee, 615 F.3d at 651–52 (affirming that the 
circuit’s law had not changed from a prior ruling in this class action litigation, 
where the circuit held that voluntary and involuntary patients in a facility 
treating developmental disabilities enjoy identical rights (citing United States v. 
Tennessee, 798 F. Supp. 483, 486 (W.D. Tenn. 1992))). 
 95. Hagan, supra note 2, at Part VI.A. 
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The only distinction among these cases appears to be 
procedural: individual claims versus class actions. However, in 
another class action, after Doe but prior to Tennessee, another 
district court felt bound by Higgs v. Latham to exclude 
constitutional claims of institutionalized individuals with mental 
retardation and psychiatric diagnoses who were voluntarily 
placed in the institution by their guardians.96 
The First Circuit provides another example of confusion 
within the circuits regarding the boundaries of functional 
custody. Ms. Hagan describes Monahan v. Dorchester,97 presaged 
by an even stricter reliance on the voluntary–involuntary 
distinction by the state’s highest court.98 Yet the First Circuit 
later affirmed a substantial damage judgment to a patient, 
admitted pursuant to a voluntary admission form, against staff 
members who had beaten him after he was restrained, and 
against their supervisor who did nothing to stop them.99 Even 
though the patient was technically voluntary, the district court 
had refused to dismiss the case because the patient had not been 
afforded the rights provided under a Massachusetts statute, 
which allows voluntary patients to consult with an attorney prior 
to withdrawing a petition to leave the facility.100 This finding was 
not pursued on appeal.101 
                                                                                                     
 96. Martin v. Voinovich, 840 F. Supp. 1175, 1207 (S.D. Ohio 1993). 
 97. Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., 961 F.2d 987 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 98. Williams v. Hartman, 413 Mass. 398, 403 (1992) (“[A] patient who is 
voluntarily committed to a State mental health facility does not possess the 
same Federal constitutional rights as an involuntarily committed patient.”). 
 99. See Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 2001) (affirming a 
judgment awarding $100,000 in compensatory damages plus $1,550,000 in 
punitive damages), cert. denied 535 U.S. 1053 (2002).  
 100. Id. at 92–96.  
 101. Id. at 91 (stating the grounds for appeal).  
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D. State-Created Harm and State Increase of Danger in the 
Context of Institutionalized Patients 
1. Actions by State Actors versus Private Individuals 
One crucial limitation of DeShaney is that it applies only to 
the state’s responsibility to protect a citizen from the violence or 
harm of a private citizen. State actors who directly harm a citizen 
(as opposed to failing to protect him or her) or deprive the citizen 
of liberty are not shielded by DeShaney: DeShaney is simply not 
relevant to cases claiming violence or deprivation of liberty by 
state actors. The Constitution’s “charter of negative liberties” is 
explicitly aimed at protecting citizens from arbitrary denials of 
life, liberty, and property at the hands of state agents.102  
This has been a key distinction in many cases. For example, 
the panel in Lanman v. Hinson found that the central distinction 
with Higgs was that in the latter case, Ms. Higgs was raped by 
another patient—a third party—while in Lanman, state agents 
were charged with having killed Mr. Lanman during a 
restraint.103 This distinction—whether the party causing the 
harm is a state agent or a private party—has been cited by other 
courts to find that plaintiffs have stated a constitutional claim.104  
The distinction is, in fact, useful in cases like DeShaney or in 
cases involving school children that take place in the free world. 
The state should be responsible for the constitutional violations of 
its own actors, regardless of the legal status of the 
institutionalized patient or even whether an individual is 
institutionalized at all. It is state responsibility for protecting 
against private violence that must be limited in some way. The 
Supreme Court has chosen to limit it by confining liability to 
                                                                                                     
 102. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
196 (1989) (stating that the purpose of the Due Process Clause “was to protect 
the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each 
other”). 
 103. Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 682 n.1 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 104. Doe v. Covington Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 855 n.3 (5th Cir. 2012) (en 
banc); Woods v. G.B. Cooley Hosp. for Retarded Citizens, No. 07-0926, 2007 U.S. 
Dist LEXIS 74760, at *7 n.2 (W.D. La. Aug. 22, 2007); Clark v. Donohue, 885 F. 
Supp. 1159, 1162 (S.D. Ind. 1995). 
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cases in which the state created or exacerbated the danger, or has 
limited or restrained the liberty of the individual in ways that 
preclude the individual or others from protecting himself or 
herself.105 
Both of these exceptions are at work in the closed setting of 
an institution. The distinction between private parties and state 
agents, so useful in the world at large, breaks down when the 
boundaries of the patient’s world—a world from which no exit is 
possible without state consent—are completely within state-
owned, state-staffed, state-supervised, and state-operated 
property. Unlike the outside world, other patients are not 
unconstrained, unsupervised free agents. Other patients are 
there precisely because a mental health professional, and often 
more than one, has made a judgment that they are not safe to live 
unsupervised and free lives. Other patients are there to be 
assessed, receive treatment, and supervision. Staff is generally 
well aware of the proclivities and risks posed by various patients: 
that is the purpose of confinement in a state institution. In such 
close quarters, where neither voluntary nor involuntary patients 
are in a position to escape the aggression of others, the 
responsibility of the state to protect may depend, as it does in 
prison settings,106 on the degree to which the staff is aware of the 
inclinations and characteristics of particular patients. If a 
particularly vulnerable patient is deliberately or recklessly placed 
in harm’s way, the state may be seen to have created or increased 
the danger that ultimately befalls the patient. 
2. State-Created or -Exacerbated Harm in the Context of 
Suicidal Patients 
A number of cases that raise questions about the state’s 
affirmative duties to protect individuals arise in the context of 
suicide, either in the community after or during a police 
                                                                                                     
 105. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 & 201 n.9.  
 106. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (defining the standard 
for holding prison officials liable for private harm as requiring that “the official 
must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference”). 
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encounter, or in institutional settings. The police cases usually 
raise the question of whether police intervention escalated or 
increased the danger of suicide; courts’ analyses of these cases—
which tend to be sympathetic to police actions under 
circumstances perceived to be both exigent and complex—often 
focus heavily on the fact that the individual was not in state 
custody.107 
When the individual is in state custody, the duty to protect 
raises different issues. When Deborah Shelton was cut down after 
being found hanging, she was still alive, but state hospital nurses 
refused to perform mouth to mouth resuscitation without 
protective masks, which were unavailable at the time, a refusal 
which was permitted by hospital policy.108 The state did not have 
to respond to this issue, because the Eighth Circuit decided that 
Deborah Shelton, as a “voluntary” patient, had no rights.109 Of 
course, Deborah Shelton was no more free to leave the hospital 
than any involuntarily committed patient.  
Although I am a strong advocate of limiting the liability of 
mental health professionals for the suicide of their patients,110 
like many courts, I draw a distinction between institutionalized 
patients and patients who live in the community.111 Even in 
institutions, the legal issues around suicide revolve not so much 
around the difference between voluntary and involuntary 
patients as around the difficulty in determining which patients 
are truly at risk of suicide, given the small proportion of people 
with suicidal ideation who actually commit suicide, and the 
drawbacks of the preventive methods that are implemented to 
                                                                                                     
 107. Cutlip v. City of Toledo, No. 10-4350, 2012 U.S. App LEXIS 13753, at 
*14–19 (6th Cir. July 5, 2012); Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 506 
(6th Cir. 2002). 
 108. Shelton v. Ark. State Dep’t of Human Servs., 677 F.3d 837, 839 (8th 
Cir. 2012). 
 109. Id. at 842.  
 110. SUSAN STEFAN, RATIONAL SUICIDE, IRRATIONAL LAW (Oxford University 
Press, forthcoming 2014). 
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(collecting cases). 
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prevent suicide or self-harm, such as involuntary commitment 
and physical restraints.112 
IV. Ms. Hagan’s Proposed Standard of Analysis 
Ms. Hagan ends her Note with a proposed standard 
analyzing whether an institutionalized person has stated a 
constitutional claim that is clear and rational. She proposes that 
courts examine a claim in three steps that parallel the language 
of DeShaney itself: 
1. Is the person involuntarily in the custody of the state as a 
formal legal matter? 
2. Is the person involuntarily in the custody of the state as a 
functional matter? 
3. Has the state created or exacerbated the danger or harm 
that the plaintiff experienced?113 
Besides its clarity, Ms. Hagan’s standard makes sense. Her 
standard revolves around the state’s own actions in restraining 
the liberty of individuals or creating or exacerbating a dangerous 
condition,114 not around the mental condition or disability of the 
plaintiff, over which the state has no control.  
In determining whether the state exercises functional 
custody over the individual, Ms. Hagan proposes the standard 
used in determining whether an individual is in custody for 
purposes of Fourth Amendment doctrine: would a reasonable 
individual believe that he or she was free to leave?115 This test is 
supported by the language of case law, including DeShaney itself: 
the majority expressed the exception to the absence of any 
affirmative duty under the Constitution as existing “when the 
State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against 
                                                                                                     
 112. See also Phyllis Coleman & Ronald Shellow, Suicide: Unpredictable 
and Unavoidable—Proposed Guidelines Provide Rational Test for Physician’s 
Liability, 71 NEB. L. REV. 643 (1992). 
 113. Hagan, supra note 2, at Part VI. 
 114. Ye v. United States, 484 F.3d 634, 637 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining 
that the state’s physical custody of the individual is a key factor). 
 115. Hagan, supra note 2, at 787–88. 
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his will.”116 Subsequent cases frequently equate the question of 
whether a person is in custody with whether a reasonable person 
in his or her situation would feel free to leave.117 The Supreme 
Court has also equated custody with freedom to leave.118 Even if a 
person was too disabled to leave by himself or herself, the 
question could just as easily be asked: could a caring family 
member or friend simply drive up and remove him or her from 
state care? If the answer is yes, then there is no state obligation.  
This standard is appropriately limited. Under her proposed 
standard, as she notes, the plaintiff in Monahan v. Dorchester 
would not have prevailed, while Joyce Higgs and Deborah 
Shelton would have been allowed to proceed with their claims.119 
Psychiatrically or developmentally disabled individuals in 
community settings can virtually always move out; no state has 
created a statutory opportunity to detain and commit an 
individual who wishes to leave a community residential setting. 
But in all states a voluntary patient who wishes to leave a state 
institution can be legally detained and prevented from doing so.  
Although there are a number of articles criticizing the 
analytical chaos created by DeShaney,120 few of these focus on 
individuals in psychiatric institutions,121 and, of those, only one 
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other author has proposed a standard for interpreting DeShaney 
in this context.122 Sarah Kellogg endorses the standard suggested 
by the concurrence in the Fifth Circuit case of Walton v. 
Alexander, which called for a replacement of the voluntary–
involuntary analysis with a “special relationship” standard, 
measured by: 
1. the authority and discretion state actors have to 
control the environment and the behavior of the 
individuals in their custody;  
2. the responsibilities assumed by the State,  
3. the extent to which an individual in state custody 
must rely on the State to provide for his or her basic 
needs, and  
4. the degree of control actually exercised by the state in 
a given situation.123 
I don’t disagree with this formulation: like Ms. Hagan’s 
proposal, it focuses on the situation of the person once he or she is 
in custody or in the institution, rather than focusing entirely on 
the process by which he or she ended up in state custody. A 
person can call a police officer for help, and end up under arrest; 
the fact that the individual initiated the encounter does not 
dictate whether he or she is free to leave. No more does the fact 
that a person may have initially sought help from the state have 
any bearing on whether that institutionalized individual has any 
prospect of leaving the hospital through his or her volition alone. 
While both Ms. Kellogg’s standard and Ms. Hagan’s standard 
address this crucial problem with interpreting DeShaney, Ms. 
Hagan’s proposal is more clear and provides more guidance.  
V. Conclusion 
There is no sign that the federal appellate courts are closer to 
congruence and harmony in their interpretations of DeShaney 
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and its instructions on limiting affirmative constitutional rights. 
Ms. Hagan’s Note is timely and helpful in proposing an 
interpretive structure that would be more just and certainly 
clearer than the current caselaw. She is to be congratulated on a 
thoughtful and well-written Note. 
